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Judicial Diversity in Ireland 
 
Dr. Laura Cahillane* 
 
Judicial d4iversity is not a subject which is much discussed in Ireland. Despite the fact that 
our judiciary is still a relatively homogenous group with figures on female judges only 
recently improving, it seems neither the judges, nor the other two branches of government, 
see this as an issue which needs to be addressed. This is also in spite of the fact that our 
current process for appointing judges does not include any incentive or requirement to 
consider diversity and the recent trend which has seen the appointment of more women to 
the bench could just as easily be reversed by a future regime. Furthermore, while there has 
been some improvement in terms of gender balance, it seems there has been no 
consideration of diversity more generally in judicial appointments. In this context, this 
article examines whether diversity is an issue which needs to be considered in relation to 
judicial appointments in Ireland. First, the current profile of the Irish judiciary is 
illustrated. Then, in order to determine if and why diversity is necessary, the various 
rationales which have been put forward in favour of judicial diversity are analysed. Finally, 
the argument in favour of examining this issue in further detail in Ireland is put forward. 
 
 
I - Introduction 
 
In January 2014, the Department of Justice initiated a consultation process in relation 
to the appointment of judges in Ireland. Submissions were invited on issues such as: eligibility 
for appointment; the need to ensure and protect the principle of judicial independence; 
promoting equality and diversity; the role of the Judicial Appointments Advisory Board, 
including its membership and its procedures. Ideas were thus being sought on, amongst other 
issues, how best to promote equality and diversity in the appointments process. However, 
somewhat surprisingly, it appears the Irish judiciary themselves do not seem to see diversity 
as a priority, or even an issue which needs to be addressed.1 For many years in Ireland, the 
                                                 
* Lecturer in Constitutional Law in the University of Limerick. 
 
1 While the Judges’ Report to the Department on Reform to the Appointments Process stated that a Commission 
should be set up to take evidence on issues around diversity and suggests further study could be undertaken, the 
tenor of the Report was that progress had been made and in the absence of any evidence of a problem, the focus 
should be on judicial education. The report also stated that: “[i]t is not however apparent that alteration of the 
structure at the point of appointment to the judiciary addresses a real problem. This is important because any 
such alteration is complex to devise and operate and creates a difficult intersection with the principle of 
appointment on the basis of demonstrable merit.” Judicial Appointments Review Committee, “Preliminary 
Submission to the Department of Justice and Equality’s Public Consultation on the Judicial Appointments 
Process” (30 January 2014) 21 [hereinafter Judges’ Report], available  
<http://www.supremecourt.ie/SupremeCourt/sclibrary3.nsf/(WebFiles)/51E71A71B9961BD680257C70005
CCE2D/$FILE/A%20Preliminary%20Submission%20of%20J.A.R.C.%2030.01.2014.pdf> (date accessed: 18 
August 2015). 
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judiciary was one of the most homogeneous groups in the State, comprising mostly white, 
male, upper-class members and while this is something which has improved markedly in 
recent years, there is still some way to go in order to achieve an appropriate balance on the 
bench. However, while the need for diversity and equality in the judiciary has been recognised 
in some quarters,2 it is not something which is generally accepted in Ireland; it has not 
prompted any action at policy level and has not generated anywhere near as much discussion 
as in other common law jurisdictions with similar judicial profiles.3 Neither the media nor the 
public views this issue as important.4 Furthermore, while the consultation process mentioned 
above was a welcome initiative, it seems no further action has been taken and is not likely 
before the next general election. 
 
In this context, it is proposed to examine whether diversity is an issue which needs to 
be considered in relation to judicial appointments in Ireland. First, in order to set the context, 
the current profile of the Irish judiciary will be established. Then, in order to determine if and 
why diversity is necessary, the various rationales which have been put forward in favour of 
judicial diversity will be analysed. Finally, the argument in favour of examining this issue in 
further detail in Ireland will be put forward. 
 
II - The Profile of Judges in Ireland 
 
A study conducted in Ireland in 1969 displayed an unsurprisingly congruent picture 
of the Irish judiciary.5  At the time, there were 57 sitting judges in Ireland. Of these, only one 
was a woman. Forty-seven percent of all judges and 58% of superior court judges were born 
in an urban area. Sixty-eight percent lived in Dublin at the time of their appointment. For 
superior court judges this figure was 94%. Also 59% of all judges and 71% of superior court 
judges characterised themselves as being upper-middle class. 
                                                 
2 For example, a symposium was held on “Judicial Diversity: Strategies for Change” by the Irish Council on Civil 
Liberties and Centre for Criminal Justice and Human Rights, U.C.C. (18 September 2008). Also, the Gender 
Injustice Report highlighted this as an issue, see I. Bacik, C. Costello & E. Drew, “Women in Law – Gender 
InJustice Report” (Trinity College Law School, 2003). On Northern Ireland, see D. Feenan, “Women Judges: 
Gendering Judging, Justifying Diversity” (2008) 35 (4) Journal of Law and Society 490. 
3 While the situation with regards to diversity is admittedly much worse in England and Wales, this has led to 
a multitude of academic commentary and policy reports in that jurisdiction. Much work has also been carried 
out in other jurisdictions such as Canada, South Africa and Scotland but apart from the works mentioned supra 
note 2, there is a dearth of material here. This very fact was acknowledged in the Judges’ Report. See supra note 
1. 
4 This has been the personal experience of the author in presenting at conferences and in media interviews 
related to other judicial matters. 
5 P. Bartholomew, The Irish Judiciary (Dublin: I.P.A., 1971). Bartholomew’s study involved “nine Supreme Court 
judges, eight High Court judges, ten Circuit Court judges, and seventeen of thirty-five sitting District Court 
judges. Thus forty-four judges comprise the group used to develop this profile of an Irish judge.” 
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A similar, if less extensive, study was carried out in 2004.6 The judicial landscape had 
changed but perhaps not as much as one might have expected. The study produced an 
interesting conclusion in relation to the profile of superior court judges in Ireland: 
 
[t]he person who is most likely to be a judge of the Superior Courts in Ireland 
in 2004 is male, was born in Dublin and grew up in an urban setting. He lived 
in Dublin and was a practising Senior Counsel at the time of his appointment. 
He did not necessarily come from a legal family background. He attended a 
private secondary school and studied at University College Dublin and obtained 
a Bachelor of Arts degree. ... He was appointed after he was forty-five, but most 
likely after he was fifty. He describes himself as middle class but believes that it 
is very difficult to define or apply a social class structure to the Irish context.7 
 
Results of the study show that women made up 13.5% of superior court judges in 2004, over 
83% of judges surveyed grew up in an urban environment, all of the Supreme and High Court 
judges had an address either in Dublin or the counties immediately adjacent to Dublin at the 
time of their appointment to the judiciary. The most common occupation for a judge 
immediately prior to their appointment was that of a Senior Counsel (94.6%),8 and over 93% 
of the judges surveyed were of “pure Irish ethnicity”.9 
 
Eleven years later, and at the time of writing, the number of sitting judges is 161.10 
Of the total number of sitting judges, 33.5% are women: female representation in the Supreme 
Court is 30%, 20% in the Court of Appeal, 28.5% in the High Court, 44% in the Circuit Court, 
and 32% of the District Court. Thus, it is clear that significant progress has been made, even 
in the last year, in the attempt to secure an appropriate gender balance.11  
                                                 
6 The study was carried out as part of the author’s MA thesis and so time constraints meant that the study was 
limited to superior court judges. Twenty-nine of the 37 available High and Supreme Court judges participated 
in the study. The results of the study are set out in the following articles: J. Carroll, “You Be the Judge, Part I” 
(2005) 10 (5) Bar Review 153 [hereinafter Carroll] and J. Carroll, “You be the Judge Part II”, (2005) 10 (6) Bar 
Review 182. 
7 Carroll, ibid. at 155. 
8 Of course the Courts and Court Officers Act 2002, which changed the eligibility criteria in order to allow 
practising solicitors to be appointed, had only recently come into effect. 
9 In addition, 21% of superior court judges defined themselves as upper-middle class and 52% defined themselves 
as being middle class prior to their appointment. The phrase “pure Irish ethnicity” was used in the study without 
explanation.  
10 At the time of writing, September 2015, there was one vacancy in the High Court, one vacancy in the Circuit 
Court and one vacancy in the District Court. These figures are from the “Judicial Gender Balance 2015” Courts 
Service statistics from April 2015. 
11 Of course, one significant problem in relation to gender, particularly with the appointment of more senior 
judges is that the pool from which many appointees are drawn, the inner-Bar, contains shockingly few women. 
Of the 166 Silks appointed since 2003, only 41 have been women. While women represent 43% of the entire bar 
the inner-bar is a different matter, where men make up over 83% of members. This issue was flagged by the 
Gender in Justice report, see I. Bacik, C. Costello & E. Drew, Women in Law – Gender InJustice Report (Dublin: 
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For some, these figures appear satisfactory. However, contrast the situation in France 
in 2003, when almost 80% of those entering the judiciary were women and the Minister for 
Justice threatened to introduce quotas in order to restore gender balance and maintain public 
confidence.12 If the figures were reversed in Ireland and it were the men who were sitting at 
about 30%, we would hear a lot more about it. Even apart from gender, it is doubtful that the 
average superior court judge, as described above in 2004, has changed much in the past eleven 
years. In fact, a quick appraisal of the biographies of those Justices show that the 
overwhelming majority are still from Dublin, educated in U.C.D. and from an upper-middle 
class background. But the judges themselves do not see diversity as an issue which is relevant 
to judging.13 
 
While things are changing slowly and the increase in female appointments to the 
bench in recent years provides some evidence of a change, there is a need for action to ensure 
that the process continues on the right track. Just because the current Government has made 
a point of selecting outstanding women to judicial office does not mean that the diversity issue 
has been solved; the current appointments process does nothing to encourage or ensure 
diversity and there is nothing to prevent a future Government undoing much of the work 
which has been done. Furthermore, there is no evidence that diversity more generally (apart 
from gender diversity) has been considered at all in relation to appointments to the judiciary 
to date. In the 2014 consultation, one of the questions to be answered was: what can be done 
in order to promote diversity and equality in the legal professions in Ireland?  Of course, a 
more preliminary question is: why is judicial diversity (and diversity in the legal profession 
in general)14 important and do we need it? It is important, if the appointments process is to 
be reformed, with an eye on diversity, that we first establish that judicial diversity is a 
necessary goal and that this is recognised by all of the stakeholders involved. Ireland is 
perhaps coming a bit late to the game in this respect as this is an issue which has only recently 
become topical here. However, other jurisdictions have already had this discussion and a 
number of different rationales for the need for judicial diversity have been put forward. 
                                                 
Trinity College Law School, 2003) More recently, Conor Gallagher and Elizabeth Fitzgerald wrote separate 
pieces in the Irish Times on this issue and it is clear that where women are concerned, there are barriers to 
becoming a SC. See C. Gallagher “Why are so few women becoming senior counsel?” Irish Times (9 December 
2013) and E. Fitzgerald, “Barrister fee records reveal scale of gender inequality” Irish Times (20 January 2014).  
This is certainly another area where the lack of diversity should be considered. 
12 T. Rubens, “France has Plenty of Women Judges – Why Don’t We?” The Times (9 March 2004). Also quoted 
in E. Rackley, Women, Judging and the Judiciary: From Difference to Diversity, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013) at 19 
[hereinafter Rackley]. 
13 Judges’ Report, supra note 1 at 22. Also, see below.  
14 While the issues of equality and diversity in the legal profession in general are equally pressing, it would not 
be possible to consider both in such a piece and so this article will focus specifically on diversity in the judiciary. 
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III - Why do we need a diverse judiciary?15 
 
Various different rationales have been given in answer to questions around the need 
for diversity.  Some are contentious, others less so, but while there does not exist a consensus, 
it is possible to identify the common and most influential arguments.  
 
A. Equal opportunity and fairness 
 
One quite obvious rationale is that of equal opportunity and fairness. Lady Brenda 
Hale has described this rationale as the argument that “all properly qualified and suitable 
candidates should have a fair crack of the whip and an equal chance of appointment, being 
considered impartially and solely on their merits and not in some other way or for some other 
reason.”16 She specifies further that this involves two aspects – process and criteria. By 
process, Hale is referring to the appointments process itself, and in particular, the now defunct 
process then operating in the U.K. which was characterised by a “lack of openness, the 
continuing role of patronage, the dominance of an elite group of chambers and the need to be 
‘known’ in order to be appointed.”17 Her arguments about criteria are mainly based on the 
concept of merit and how this is defined. She also questions the obsession with advocacy as a 
necessary criterion in the appointments process and asks why there are not more academic 
appointments. Of course, some of Lady Hale’s criticisms have since been addressed by reforms 
in the U.K.18 but the more general argument around the necessity for equal opportunity 
remains. 
 
Kate Malleson refers to this argument as the equity principle; the idea that it is 
inherently unfair that men enjoy a near monopoly of judicial power.19 This idea takes as fact 
that men and women are equally qualified as judges and that “there are no qualities or 
characteristics, whether genetic or learnt, which make men better suited to public life and 
justify their domination of decision-making bodies.”20 Erika Rackley describes the argument 
as “essentially one of equal opportunities and fairness: all suitably qualified candidates should 
                                                 
15 While these arguments relate to diversity in a general sense, the issue of gender diversity is focused on in 
particular. 
16 B. Hale, “Equality and the Judiciary: why should we want more women judges?” (2001) Public Law 1 at 1 
[hereinafter Hale].  
17 Ibid. at 2.  
18 At the time she was writing, the process for appointments involved the old “tap on the shoulder” and “secret 
soundings” methods. These have since been replaced by a more transparent system involving applications to a 
Judicial Appointments Commission. See Constitutional Reform Act 2005. 
19 K. Malleson, “Justifying Gender Equality” (2003) Feminist Legal Studies 1 at 15 [hereinafter Malleson]. 
20 Ibid.  
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have a ‘fair crack of the whip’ when it comes to the process of and criteria for judicial 
appointment.”21 The principle is almost opposite to the difference argument, outlined below, 
in that it assumes that women are not necessarily going to transform judicial decision-making 
but simply that there is nothing about women which makes them less suitable as judicial 
candidates and thus should not be disadvantaged “by factors which do not relate to their 
capacity to undertake a particular role.”22 However, it is this very fact which can also be seen 
as a weakness in the rationale, as Malleson explains. The argument is more concerned “with 
the interests of the participants rather than society as a whole.” Given that this argument is 
individualistic rather than societal, Malleson argues that it is not strong enough on its own 
to promote the need for diversity and thus it is necessary to combine it with “a rationale which 
demonstrates that equal participation is a prerequisite for the proper functioning of 
[society]”23 – the idea of legitimacy. 
 
B. Democratic Legitimacy 
 
Another quite convincing rational is based on the concept of democratic legitimacy, 
sometimes linked with public confidence in the judiciary and the idea of having a judiciary 
that is reflective of society. There is much research which points to the general perception of 
the public that the judiciary is not representative of society; in fact many people believe that 
the judiciary is out of touch with society – that it comprises a bunch of “pompous old weirdos” 
who would not understand the workings of the real world.24 The fact is that in order to ensure 
public confidence in the judiciary, it needs to be more representative of the community as a 
whole and not “mainly male, overwhelmingly white, [and] largely the product of a limited 
range of educational institutions and social backgrounds.”25 This does not mean that a judge 
should represent any particular interests. On the contrary, the idea is that judges remain 
impartial but that as a diverse group they can better understand and reflect the diverse nature 
of the community.  The argument is similar to that used to justify the current methods of jury 
selection, which attempt to ensure representation of a fair cross section of the community. 
 
                                                 
21 Rackley, supra note 12 at 26. 
22 Ibid. at 17. 
23 Ibid. at 18.  
24 See for example, H. Genn, Paths to Justice: What People Do and Think about Going to Law (Oxford: Hart, 1999) 
at 241.  
25 Hale supra note 16 at 10.  
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Malleson advances the legitimacy argument on the basis of the “increasing acceptance 
that the judiciary is a political institution.”26 She explains this as follows: “judges at all levels 
are exercising power and so are engaged in politics as widely defined. As such, the demands 
of democratic principles and the need for legitimacy apply to the judiciary as much to any 
other institution of power ... .”27 Hale has also made a similar argument: 
 
[t]he judiciary may or should be independent of government and Parliament 
but ultimately we are the link between them both and the people. We are the 
instrument by which the will of Parliament and government is enforced upon 
the people. We are also the instrument which keeps other organs of the state, 
the police and those who administer the laws, under control. ... [Therefore,] 
judges should be no less representative of the people than the politicians and 
civil servants who govern us.28 
 
Sally Kenney has expanded the legitimacy argument, linking it with the notion of 
representativeness and using the example of geography in relation to appointment of judges 
to the E.C.J. She argues that courts, particularly supranational and federal courts, are 
representative institutions and that issues such as representation of geography, nationality, 
area of legal expertise and other non-merit factors are often factored into the judicial selection 
process.29 She points to the fact that E.C.J. includes a judge from each member state and 
questions whether individual member states would be willing to accept E.C.J. decisions were 
it not for this fact. It is never argued that judges from the member states are “representing” 
their member state in the decision-making process but yet it adds to the legitimacy of the 
Court to have all member states included. Demonstrating the dichotomy between the notions 
of geographical representativeness and gender representativeness, she asks:  
 
[w]hy is it not seen as a deviation from merit to exclude the possibility that the 
ECJ could consist of twenty-seven German judges but a terrible deviation from 
merit to prohibit it from being all male? Choosing the best woman judge is not 
more antithetical to applying Merit standards than choosing the best Cypriot 
judge. The difference is that requiring diversity of nationality or geography has 
been accepted as a representative restriction, where gender diversity has not.30 
 
Kenney also refers to the arguments around the inclusion of women in juries to demonstrate 
the idea of legitimacy. She notes that in discussions around this issue, courts repeatedly say 
                                                 
26 Malleson, supra note 19 at 18. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Hale, supra note 16 at 10-11.   
29 S. J. Kenney, Gender and justice: why women in the judiciary really matter (New York: Routledge, 2013), ch. 6 
[hereinafter Kenney]. 
30 Ibid. at 128. 
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that it is important not only that justice is done but that justice is also seen to be done. So 
that “[i]f a black man faces an all-white jury, a woman faces and all-male jury, or a Greek 
national faces an international court made up only of Germans, justice may not be seen to be 
done.”31 The point is that if women are excluded from juries or judging, justice will not be 
seen to be done and “the process and the result will both lack legitimacy”.32 
 
However, Malleson has also noted that “the notion of representativeness is potentially 
problematic when applied to the judiciary since it suggests that a judge might in some way 
have been selected to represent the interests of a particular group.”33 Indeed she notes the 
statement of the 1996 Home Affairs Select Committee on judicial appointments that “it is not 
the function of the judiciary to reflect particular sections of the community, as it is of the 
democratically elected legislature.”34 This view is echoed in the Irish Judges’ Report: 
 
[n]o one has a right to have their case determined by a judge drawn from any 
particular group or having any particular characteristic. Single judges make 
judgments on married people, young judges make decisions about older people, 
gay judges make decisions about heterosexuals, female judges make judgments 
about men, atheists and agnostics make decisions about believers and in each 
case, and obviously, vice versa. This is how it should be.35 
 
Thus, it is clearly felt by the Irish judges that issues of representativeness are irrelevant. 
However, this view is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain as the judges become more 
politically active. Professor John Griffith referred to this issue in his evidence to that 1996 
Committee that “the fact that both branches of government exercise political power means 
that it is increasingly legitimate to expect them equally to constitute a ‘fair reflection’ of 
English society.”36 Kenney also notes that it is becoming more difficult to characterise legal 
decision-making as apolitical and “[o]nce judging is conceived as making choices about public 
policy, less justification exists for allowing only a narrow segment of the legal profession to 
serve.”37 Furthermore, Rackley provides a solution to this issue by pointing out that the 
terminology of “representation” is misleading. She explains that it is “more accurate to say 
that the judiciary ought to reflect the community”.38 What this means is that the judiciary 
                                                 
31 Ibid. at 175. 
32 Ibid.  
33 K. Malleson, The New Judiciary; The Effects of Expansion and Activism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999) at 108. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Judges’ Report, supra note 1 at 22. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Kenney, supra note 29 at 129. 
38 Rackley, supra note 12 at 24. 
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should comprise a mix of individuals from a variety of backgrounds, beliefs and perspectives 
and not one which is essentially “male and pale”. Given the general views held by society 
mentioned above, this is a particularly strong rationale.  
 
C. Others 
 
Various other rationales have been put forward including a symbolic argument 
espoused by Beverly McLachlin, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada. In explaining 
her reasoning on why increasing the representation of women on the bench will change the 
legal system for the better, she first mentions the public confidence rationale and then goes 
on to state as a “second reason” that “[i]n a world where one of the primary functions of the 
judiciary is to promote equality and fairness, it would be anomalous if the very instrument 
charged with that goal should itself exclude women from its ranks.”39  McLachlin C.J. also 
puts forward a third reason, which she refers to as utilitarian: 
 
[s]imply put, it represents a sound use of human resources. It seems to me that 
modern societies cannot afford to lose the intellectual power and energy of half 
the population ... . Our society is increasingly complex, our birth rates are low. 
We need the wisdom, not only of wise men, but of our wise women.40  
 
Her last reason, and the one she considers most important, is one which requires a little more 
analysis – that women judges can make a difference. 
 
D. Difference 
 
By far the most controversial rationale, and one that is often most relied upon, is based 
around the idea of difference. Arguments based on difference claim that women will bring a 
unique contribution to the bench as a result of their different life experiences, values and 
attitudes. These arguments go much further than those outlined earlier in that they require 
not only the presence of more women on the bench but also that these women will actually 
make a difference when they get there; that because of their biological differences and the 
                                                 
39 McLachlin C.J. at a seminar run by the Association of Women Barristers, House of Commons London, 2 July 
2003, as cited by B. Hale, “Making a Difference? Why We Need a More Diverse Judiciary” (2005) 56 N.I.L.Q. 
281 at 285.  
40 Ibid. 
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different value-systems they have, women will make different, or even better, decisions than 
male judges.41  Many of these arguments draw on Carol Gilligan’s “ethic of care” theory.42 
 
While this theory is, admittedly, quite persuasive and indeed provides an “almost 
unanswerable claim for the participation of women in the judiciary”,43 there are many dangers 
in this approach. The first problem is that despite numerous studies which have been carried 
out on the question of whether women judge differently, there is no conclusive empirical 
evidence to support the theory.44 Another problem arises with regard to impartiality; if 
women judges were to take a more favourable approach to a woman’s evidence or arguments 
this would not be compatible with the crucial principle of impartiality.45 In one of her earlier 
articles on this issue, Lady Hale argued similarly “women do not want to claim that they look 
at things differently from men, partly because this would be manifestly inaccurate in many 
cases and partly because it would make them less well qualified to be judges”.46 Another 
problem which impacts directly on women judges is that the difference argument places too 
great a burden on the women who eventually do ascend to the bench. It “raises the expectation 
of superiority; women judges can ‘hear’ all the different voices which are raised in court ... .”47 
Thus, women judges would have to prove that they are somehow superior – an obviously 
impossible task. A related objection is that this rationale risks “reifying certain ‘feminine’ 
ideals perceived as unique to women and fails to account for significant differences between 
women.”48 Thus it assumes that all women are alike. Finally, the ultimate danger with this 
rationale is this: “[i]f gender difference is the basis for gender equality, then what happens if 
it is proved that no significant differences exist? … Or that they do exist but do not improve 
the quality of justice?”49 It is for these reasons that Malleson argues we should abandon the 
difference argument and focus on the rationales of equity and legitimacy. 
 
                                                 
41 See for example, S. Goldman , “Should there be Affirmative Action for the Judiciary?”, (1979) 62 Judicature 
489 at 494; I. Grant & L. Smith, “Gender Representation in the Canadian Judiciary”, in Appointing Judges: 
Philosophy, Politics and Perspective (Toronto: Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1991) 57 at 73; S. McRae, Women 
at the Top (London: Hansard Society, 1996) at 9; C. McGlynn, The Woman Lawyer: Making the Difference (London: 
Butterworths, 1998) at 187.  
42 See C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1982).  
43 Malleson, supra note19 at 4. 
44 Ibid. at 5-7. 
45 Ibid. at 9-10. 
46 Hale, supra note 16 at 13. 
47 Malleson, supra note 19 at 13. 
48 D. Feenan, “Women Judges: Gendering Judging, Justifying Diversity” (2008) 35 (4) Journal of Law and 
Society 490 at 492 [hereinafter Feenan]. 
49 Malleson, supra note 19 at 14. 
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However, in more recent times, the difference argument has resurfaced in a more 
nuanced fashion. As Rackley has explained, we should not argue that women judges make a 
difference but that they bring different perspectives. She elaborates that we should not 
suggest that women judges speak with a “different voice” but:  
 
[p]roperly understood, the promise of judicial difference (however defined) lies 
in its ability to render the contingent particular but dominant forces of judicial 
reasoning – that is the incorporation of difference on the bench exposes the 
extent to which the privileging of particular knowledges, the flattening of 
difference and the suppression of polytonality both affect and effect women, 
judging and the delivery of justice.50  
 
The point is that “who the judge is” matters. 
 
In 2008, Dermot Feenan published the findings of a survey of women judges in 
Northern Ireland, which appeared to offer new understandings of the role of judging and 
which emphasised the distinctiveness of background and experience and demonstrated how 
this can enhance the diversity rationale.51 The majority of female judges interviewed felt that 
women judges would make a difference in various ways but not necessarily to the process or 
outcome of judging. The response of one interviewee sums up the consensus: “[y]ou don’t 
apply the law any differently, but I do think you see things from a different angle.”52 Even the 
responses from male judges indicated a recognition of a “difference of perspective”.53 Feenan 
concluded that the differences that women bring to judging involve “experiential sensitivities 
that may inform judging.” He noted that the responses did not suggest that women would 
decide cases any differently, “but their responses also reflect nuances in understanding the 
role of the judicial office that are not shared by male judges.54 The results are echoed in studies 
carried out elsewhere which demonstrated differences in the way women judges approach 
decision-making.55 
 
                                                 
50 E. Rackley, “What a difference difference makes: gendered harms and judicial diversity” (2008) 15 
International Journal of the Legal Profession 37 at 38 [hereinafter Rackley, “What a difference”].  
51 Feenan supra note 48 at 491. The research was conducted during 2004-2005 and involved questionnaires and 
interviews with a sample of 45 female judges, representing 27% of the total number of female judges.  
52 Ibid. at 512. 
53 Ibid. at 516. 
54Ibid. at 517. 
55 See B. Kohn, “Family Judges in the City of Buenos Aires: a view from within” (2008) 15 (1-2) International 
Journal of the Legal Profession 111. See also M. C. Bellau & R. Johnson, “Judging Gender: Difference and 
Dissent at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2008) 15 (1-2) International Journal of the Legal Profession 57 at 62. 
The evidence showed that women did not always share the same perspective but a positioning that left them 
seeing something different. 
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While the traditional arguments based on difference, focused on decisional outcomes 
and essentially reduced law to judgments, this new approach looks at the whole process of 
judging and the distinctiveness that women and other minorities can bring to this process.56 
As Rackley has put it, difference “is not an end in itself but rather a route to engendering 
diverse perspectives on adjudication, justice and law.”57 
 
Lady Hale has also changed her views on difference. Originally, she was sceptical 
about the ability of women judges to make a difference, although she always maintained that 
a more diverse bench “might ... bring about some collective change in empathy and 
understanding for the diverse backgrounds, experience and perspectives of those whose cases 
come before them”.58 In 2004, she acknowledged that “the incorporation of difference on the 
bench subtly changes and, ultimately improves the judicial product”,59 and by 2013, she had 
come to the view that she and other women judges do actually make a difference: 
 
I have come to agree with those great women judges who think that sometimes, 
on occasions, we may do so (make a difference). That is the result of the lived 
experience of being a judge for 19 years now and a law lord for nine. Of course, 
the cases I remember more clearly are the cases where I failed to make a 
difference, because I failed to persuade my colleagues to see things the same way 
I did. On those occasions, there is still a benefit in having someone there to voice 
the minority view, perhaps to lay down a marker for the future, and perhaps to 
reassure that part of the human race that holds up half the sky that someone up 
there is listening.60 
 
This more nuanced difference approach is more easily reconciled with the other 
rationales based on equity and legitimacy.61 Moreover, it provides an even more convincing 
rationale. As Rackley has commented, “a truly diverse judiciary is not simply apposite (on 
grounds of, say, equal opportunities or democratic legitimacy) but rather essential if we are 
to realise the best we possibly can in terms of justice, judgments and judging.”62  
                                                 
56 According to Rosemary Hunter, feminist judges make a difference in four areas: court process, case outcome, 
reasons given for a decision and extra-curricular activities. See R. Hunter “Can Feminist judges make a 
difference?”(2008) 15 (1-2) International Journal of the Legal Profession 7.  In fact, there is now much research 
to demonstrate that feminist judges (not necessarily female judges) do make a quantifiable difference in terms of 
outcome. See for example, R. Hunter, C. McGlynn, & E. Rackley ed., Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice 
(Oxford: Hart, 2010). There are now similar projects in many other jurisdictions which have seen similar results. 
57 Rackley, “What a difference”, supra note 50 at 41. 
58 Hale, supra note 16 at 9. 
59B. Hale, “The Unique Perspectives of Women Judges on the Law” (Bar Reform Lecture, Inner Temple, 
London, 2004). 
60 Ibid.  
61 See Feenan, supra note 48 at 518. 
62 Rackley, “What a difference”, supra note 50 at 49. See also, Rackley, supra note 12. 
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It is certainly dangerous to argue that difference involves something in the essence of 
femininity – women will not necessarily have a shared perspective by virtue of their gender 
but they may well bring different perspectives to bear in their interaction with the judicial 
process, as will other judges from non-traditional backgrounds. Whether you can classify this 
phenomenon as “a different voice” remains, perhaps, controversial. 
 
IV - Reconciling these rationales with the notion of “judging” in Ireland 
 
In order to accept any of these rationales, we have to consider whether they can be 
reconciled with the notion of judging in Ireland. As noted above, judges in Ireland do not see 
gender, or indeed diversity generally, as relevant to judging.63 The Judges’ Report states that 
what is important is “sympathetic and knowledgeable hearing of the individual case rather 
than the fact that the adjudicator comes from a particular group.”64 Indeed the general picture 
put forward of the role of judging in Ireland is usually one based on objectivity and neutrality, 
whereby judges are not influenced by their own backgrounds or experiences but simply apply 
the rules in a detached manner. 
 
In an address to the judges of the Circuit Court, former Chief Justice Tom Finlay 
enunciated this idea and warned his audience that “indulgence in general pronouncements on 
the customs, manners and morals of a society” is not a function of the judge.65 Former High 
Court Judge Declan Costello acknowledged that judges will have their own views on the 
moral issues which may arise in the course of their duties but stated that because judges are 
required to give reasons for their conclusions, they must engage in “self-critical examination 
… [which also exposes them to] the critical examination of others” and this then leads to 
“judicial objectivity”.66 
 
Justice Cross has elaborated on the role of the judge, explaining that the judge seeks 
“justice and fairness. These are objective ideals and the judge will apply the law with that 
objective in mind.”67 He also proposes that, “[d]ecisions should be as objective as possible, 
based on where the legal evidence leads and not based on a judge’s view of how society ought 
                                                 
63 See supra note 1. 
64 Ibid. 
65 T. Finlay, “The Role of the Judge” (2005) J.S.I.J. 1 at 4.  
66 D. Costello, “The Irish Judge as Law-Maker” in D. Curtin and D. O’Keefe eds., Constitutional Adjudication in 
European Community and National Law, (London: Butterworths, 1992) 159 at 162.  
67 K. Cross, “Fiat Justicia” (54) Dublin Review of Books (22 April 2014), at 6 <http://www.drb.ie/essays/fiat-
justitia> (date accessed: 14 May 2016). 
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to work. Society rightly expects a judge to set his own bias and prejudices and views aside 
and apply the rules”.68 However, as David Kenny has recently pointed out, “[t]he objectivity 
that Justice Cross perceives in the judicial enterprise is, in part, a product of the largely 
homogenous philosophy of Irish judges, which is itself a product of the restrictive view of 
who would make a good judge that he advocates.”69 Kenny further states that: 
 
[t]he homogeneous professional backgrounds of our judges result in a narrow 
interpretive community, which is compounded by homogenous social, cultural, 
educational and intellectual backgrounds. Because part of the interpretive 
community will be influenced by life experiences outside of professional 
background, a lack of diversity further narrows the views within the 
community.70 
 
In other words, it is easy for Irish judges to talk about neutrality and objectivity when 
they are generally drawn from a very narrow section of society where the experiences, 
education and backgrounds may be so similar as to limit the emergence of “different” views. 
While the politically correct line may be to maintain that “who the judge is” does not matter 
to the process of judging, it is clear that this does not stand up to scrutiny.71 Take for example 
the case of a High Court judge giving an interpretation of the Constitution; Bunreacht na 
hÉireann is, in many instances, a very vague text and is open to interpretation. There are no 
clear guidelines and no obvious answers; depending on the philosophy of the particular judge, 
the interpretation will not always be predictable and indeed a different judge might take a 
different view.72 As Kenny has noted:  
 
[t]he Constitution is dependent for its meaning on what we understand it to be 
doing, what its goals and objectives are. These understandings are our politics, 
and without them, the Constitution would be mired in ambiguities. It is the 
politics that we have – and the sense of direction and purpose that it gives us – 
that grounds our understanding and gives indeterminate text determinate 
meaning.73 
                                                 
68 Ibid.  
69 D. Kenny, “Merit, diversity and interpretive communities: The (non-party) politics of Judicial Appointments 
and Constitutional Adjudication” in L. Cahillane, G. Gallen & T. Hickey, Judges, Politics and the Irish Constitution 
(forthcoming, Manchester University Press) [hereinafter Kenny].  
70 Ibid. 
71 The various feminist judgments projects have provided conclusive evidence of the difference that perspective 
can make to judging. See R. Hunter, C. McGlynn, and E. Rackley, eds., Feminist judgments: from theory to practice 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), the Irish equivalent is available at <http://www.feministjudging.ie/>. See also 
R. Graycar, “Gender, race, bias and perspective: OR, how otherness colours your judgment” (2008) 15(1-2) 
International Journal of the Legal Profession 73. 
72 Indeed it has often happened in the past that the Supreme Court will take a completely different interpretation 
from that which was taken in the High Court.  
73 Kenny, supra note 69. 
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Perhaps the reason why we have not yet had this conversation on the need for judicial 
diversity in Ireland is because the Irish judiciary wishes to preserve the traditional notions of 
neutrality and therefore avoid the assumption that judging is more than a technical or 
mechanical process. If you accept this assumption, that judging is an almost automated action, 
which is not influenced by background or personal or cultural experience, then there is an 
argument to be made that diversity is not relevant to judging. However, we cannot avoid the 
fact that, despite what Justice Cross or the Irish Judges’ Report might indicate, judges are 
influenced by their backgrounds, experiences and education. In order to embrace the idea of 
diversity and reconcile the rationales for diversity with the notions of “judging” in Ireland, 
we first have to recognise that fact.  
 
In order to accept the new “difference” rationale or the “different perspectives” rationale, we 
have to accept that a judge’s perspective matters and in fact is useful in the judicial process.74 
To accept the legitimacy argument we have to also accept that courts are representative 
institutions. We have already accepted this to a certain extent. Lady Hale has pointed to the 
fact that in the U.K., there is already a requirement to consider geographical diversity, and 
has questioned why this cannot be extended to other types of diversity.75  In addition, in 
Northern Ireland, the Judicial Appointments Commission is required “so far as is reasonably 
practicable to do so, to secure that a range of persons reflective of the community in Northern 
Ireland is available for consideration by the Commission whenever it is required to select a 
person to be appointed, or recommended for appointment, to a listed judicial office”.76 In 
Ireland, there was a convention, now no longer in use, that at least one member of the High 
or Supreme Court should be drawn from the Protestant community.77 Thus, there are existing 
precedents where notions of representativeness have been accepted. Even if the notion of 
representativeness causes discomfort amongst those on the bench, we can always accept 
Rackley’s suggestion that the judiciary should be a fair reflection of Irish society, which in 
itself will address the issues with the public’s perception of the judiciary and the issue of justice 
being seen to be done.  
 
                                                 
74 See, e.g., the work cited supra note 71. 
75 Ibid.  Section 27(8) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, requires that at the same time as appointing on merit, 
it must be ensured that “between them, the judges will have knowledge of, and experience of practice in, the law 
of each part of the United Kingdom.” 
76 Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002, s.5(10)(b) as amended by the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2004, s.3. 
77 See D. G. Morgan, Constitutional Law of Ireland, 2nd ed. (Dublin: Roundhall, 1990) at 14. 
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To accept any of these rationales, it is also necessary to openly recognise that non-
merit factors have always been part of the selection process in Ireland. Indeed, it would be 
difficult to dispute the fact that for many years political allegiance was the most important 
factor in judicial appointments.78  
 
There is a theory that judges are neutral and objective – the herculean fairy tale – and 
it seems the Irish judiciary wishes to maintain this fiction. If that were true then perhaps the 
arguments in favour of diversity would be minimised but the undeniable truth is that judges 
are human and they do bring their own perspectives to bear when judging; judges, like all 
other humans, operate from their own perspectives and are influenced by their own 
experiences and backgrounds – they would not be human otherwise. Judges are certainly not 
“computers in robes” and nor would we want them to be.79 When judges encounter Dworkin’s 
“hard cases”, for which there are no rules or straight answers, they must use their own 
discretion and rely on their own judgment with the benefit of their own life experience. For 
that reason alone, we need to ensure that we have a wide variety of perspectives and 
backgrounds being brought to bear on the bench. Perhaps it is time for us in Ireland to let go 
of the fairy tale and accept that diversity and “who the judge is”80 matters. 
 
V – Conclusion 
 
It would be easy to point to the recent increase in female appointments to the judiciary 
as evidence that there are no problems in relation to judicial diversity, at least with regard to 
gender, in Ireland. However, this is a very cosmetic view of the situation, which accepts that 
a ratio of about 30:70 women to men in the judiciary is acceptable, and which assumes future 
governments will be willing to continue this trend. When Ireland’s figures are compared 
internationally, a more realistic picture emerges: in the 2014 Council of Europe survey on 
judicial systems, Ireland was placed 7th from the bottom in a table on gender diversity of 
judicial systems in 47 European countries.81 Furthermore, when the profile of the judiciary is 
                                                 
78 In the Judges’ Report, it was accepted that party political preference has often played a role in appointments 
and the Report maintained that “it is simply wrong in principle that consideration of political considerations 
should form any part of the decision process”; Judges’ Report, supra note 1 at 16.  
79 M. Minow & E. Spelman, “Passion for Justice” in J. T. Noonan Jr. & K. I. Winston, The Responsible Judge: 
Readings in Judicial Ethics, (Westpost: Praeger, 1993) 257 at 259-260. 
80 See Rackley, “What a difference”, supra note 50 at 41. 
81 Council of Europe, European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice Report on European Judicial Systems 
“Efficiency and quality of justice”, 2014 Edition 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/2014/synthese2014_en.pdf> (date accessed: 14 
May 2016). Only the U.K. countries, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Israel were ranked below Ireland. While the data 
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more closely examined, we can see that even apart from gender, very little diversity exists 
within their ranks. Malleson argued in 2003 that, “[i]t is now so widely accepted that the 
goal of gender equality in … the judiciary … is an unqualified good, that to ask the question 
why this is necessary seems redundant, if not perverse.”82 However, given the apparent 
nonchalance of the relevant stakeholders in Ireland, it has been deemed necessary to set this 
issue out here. Whether or not the difference argument is accepted, it is clear that judicial 
diversity is a worthwhile goal. This is something which has been recognised in the U.K. and 
has been reflected in its political agenda for at least the last ten years.83  
 
While in Ireland, our numbers may seem more favourable when compared with those 
in the U.K., the problem here is that our judicial appointments system does nothing to ensure 
that the recent trend, which has improved diversity, will continue. In fact, a future 
Government could well reverse the trend. Interestingly, Lady Hale believes that politicians 
are more sensitive to this issue than the judiciary and are more likely to address diversity.84 
This may be true and while our system, rightly or not, places much power in the hands of 
politicians, this does not take away the fact that there is currently no requirement to consider 
diversity. Nor, it seems, is there any political will to examine this issue and set up a taskforce 
on judicial diversity or some equivalent, as has been done in many other jurisdictions. 
 
The means of promoting and achieving diversity is a discussion for another day. 
Whenever reform to the judicial appointments process is finally tackled in Ireland, it is to be 
hoped that methods of insuring diversity will be considered, but at the very least, it is to be 
hoped that judicial diversity will be acknowledged as a worthwhile and necessary pursuit and 
one that is vital in maintaining public confidence in the judiciary.85 
                                                 
used was from 2012, the closest country above Ireland was Turkey, which had 34.4% women judges and thus 
would be ahead even using Ireland’s current figures.  
82 Malleson, supra note 19 at 1.  
83 The Department of Constitutional Affairs 2005 press notice acknowledges this: “[t]he public needs to have 
confidence in judges who more closely reflect the diversity of the nation, and who have a real understanding of 
the problems faced by most people.” 
84 B. Hale, Lecture given in the University of Limerick (15 May 2015). 
85 There is much research to suggest that a judiciary which does not reflect diversity in society damages public 
confidence. See for example: H. Genn, Paths to Justice: What People Do and Think about Going to Law, (Oxford: 
Hart, 1999); R. G. Hood, S. Shute & F. Seemungal, Ethnic Minorities in the Criminal Courts: Perceptions of Fairness 
and Equality of Treatment, Lord Chancellor’s Office 2003, Research Series No. 2/03; R. Moorhead, M. Sefton & 
L. Scanlan, Just Satisfaction? What Drives Public and Participation Satisfaction with Courts and Tribunals, A Review 
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